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least some historical events.2 Not surprisingly, the character of the claims historians and others have made on behalf of the benefits of chaos theory in assisting historical understanding differ considerably, for instance depending on whether a nonlinear ("chaotic") dynamics is held to be literally driving historical processes or whether it provides only a suggestive analogy for fashioning a new genre of historical narrative. In what follows, we examine a representative claim of each kind regarding the application of chaos theory to problems of historical explanation and narration.
Among historians, excitement surrounds the alleged "new science of chaos"3 inasmuch as it appears to provide a vivid model or analogy which preserves the qualitative nature of historical narratives in the face of the typically overwhelming complexity of the events recounted.4 The basis of the comparison between historical narration and some recent and highly interesting developments in nonlinear dynamical modeling is an alleged parallel between the extreme sensitivity to initial conditions of nonlinear dynamical (and classically deterministic) systems and the massively disproportionate effects of seemingly insignificant incidents on the events chronicled in certain historical narratives. Recall that a dynamical system5 is said to be chaotic if the system shows "sensitive dependence on initial conditions," that is to say, even the slightest departure from literally "perfect" precision in ascertaining the initial values of the system's variables or parameters leads to a time evolution which becomes "chaotic," resulting in the breakdown of predictability in anything more than the very short term.6 Modeling some historical sequences as chaotic "systems," then, 2. Historian Alan Beyerchen offers this enthusiastic evaluation. "There is every reason to believe," he declares, "that the westernized world is in the early stages of an intellectual transformation of major proportions, perhaps as significant as the emergence of the modern world view in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries" (Beyerchen, 25). "Chaos theory" may be defined as the qualitative (i.e., geometric) study of nonstable aperiodic behavior in deterministic nonlinear dynamical systems; for a readable discussion of this definition, see Stephen Kellert, In the Wake of Chaos (Chicago, 1993), chapter 1. On the term "dynamical systems," see note 5 below.
3. Like other recent sexily-named scientific developments which have correspondingly been subjected to inordinate amounts of journalistic inflation (one thinks of the fad in the mid-1970s over the mathematically-related "catastrophe theory"), some promoters of "chaos theory" are quick to claim a new Weltanschauung or at least science lies in waiting for those adventurous enough to cast off the shibboleths of tradition. Among those knowledgeable enough to form a considered opinion, one (usually, not always) finds a more balanced appraisal; on catastrophe theory, see 4. Sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, for example, declares, "The object is to construct an interpretation of complex reality by surpassing the simple generalizations, interweaving them, and defining the degree of their relevance. Quantitative methods have intrinsic scientific limits. One does not move from naive qualitative methods to sophisticated quantitative methods; the path is precisely the opposite." (Wallerstein, "Whither Social Science?," Review, 6.) 5. A dynamical system is a system of first order ordinary differential equations studied "in the large," i.e., on a manifold where it is possible to "patch together smoothly" differentiation processes performed on various "local" objects. The basic mathematics of dynamical systems is thus the calculus and topology of differentiable manifolds.
6. It is with respect to such a system that "sensitive dependence on initial conditions" can be defined. That is, the change in the state of the system at a not-so-distant time t is some exponential function-a Liapunov exponent -of an infinitesimal change in the state of the system at an initial provides not only an ostensible rationale for the unpredictability of historical events, but also an apparent explanation of why some of the great dramas unfolded on the world stage are but the causal unraveling and amplification of the slightest perturbations, fortuitous circumstances, or oversights that litter the course of human events.7 The analogy straightforwardly suggests how historical "systems" could be both deterministic, that is, not random, and yet exhibit non-predictable behavior.
Enthusiasm over the prospects of chaos theory supplementing historical understanding coalesces on two theses. The first we term the Causal Thesis. This holds that chaos theory can be used to plausibly model, and so explain, causal relations for at least some historical events. As a modeling or structuring device, it is said to be more attractive than the regnant Newtonian paradigm of causal relations which is taken to require a roughly linear proportionality between cause and effect.8 According to Alan Beyerchen, "It is no longer necessary for historians to explain away the fact that small inputs can produce disproportionately large effects, while large-scale inputs can generate diminutive results; violation of proportionality is actually part of the natural order inherent in any interactive, nonlinear system."9 In short, license to conceive historical events as nonlinear systems does away with what Donald McCloskey refers to as "The [causal] Dogma of Large-Large"-the compulsion to seek only major causes of significant events.10
Imagining some historical occurrences as nonlinear "systems" also is taken to legitimate what we shall call the Convergence Thesis. The Convergence Thesis states that, once the analogy between history and chaos theory is properly time to (i.e., corresponding to lack of absolute precision in determining initial conditions).The rapid exponential divergence of trajectories in state space initially very close to one another is often taken to mark a previously unthinkable fissure in the Laplacian dream equating determinism and predictability. In fact, even though a system may exhibit such sensitive dependence, not everything about the system is unpredictable; indeed, "finding what is predictable in a background of chaos is a deep and important problem," according to David Ruelle, a leading figure in this field. See his Chance and Chaos (Princeton, 1992), 81.
7. Hayles in Chaos and Order characterizes this branch of chaos theory in the following way. "The second branch emphasizes the hidden order that exists within chaotic systems. Chaos in this usage is distinct from true randomness, because it can be shown to contain deeply encoded structures called 'strange attractors"' (9). See also Dyke, "Strange Attraction," 376.
8. Shermer states that, for historians, "chaos theory provides a new perspective of how the past changes" (1). Randolph Roth writes that the "problem for social science historians . . . is that processual metaphors drawn from classical science still captivate us with their assurance that history is orderly, repetitive, systematic, and predictable. . . . Our empirical and quantitative models of process remain rooted almost exclusively in the mechanical worldview of the seventeenth century and in the organic worldview of the nineteenth century" (200 Reisch's paper files a brief against covering-law history, prima facie a peculiar enterprise given his admission that "covering-law history has been rejected" (2). But for the purist, bad theories must be rejected for the right reasons, and previous critics have (understandably) harped upon the failure of historians to 11. See Shermer 10, 12-13. 12. Page references in the body of this essay are to their works which are cited in note 1 above. find and formulate suitable laws in the Hempelian sense -which does not yield a knock-down argument. But such an argument, "a fundamental refutation," is possible if the unviability of the covering-law model of historical explanation can be derived from an assumption of covering laws, that is, if the assumption of such laws leads to a reductio. Granting then, for purposes of argument, that there are known covering laws in history, Reisch argues that one still could not construct a covering-law explanation for historical events. This is because "history is chaotic" and "it is characteristic of events in chaotic systems that they cannot be explained with covering laws and initial conditions" (2). Moreover, Reisch contends that his argument "against covering-law history is simultaneously one in favor of narrative" (2), more exactly, that "covering-law explanations must be resolved into narrative temporal structures" (18). Reisch's ironic conclusion is that, given laws appropriate to historical events, the historian has no choice but to narrate.
Reisch's argument may be reconstructed as follows:
(R) Assume for purposes of argument that historians possess covering laws. In particular, these are differential laws such that, together with a specification of initial conditions, it is in principle possible to derive correct predictions about any future state of the historical "system."15
(1) Historical processes and events exhibit "sensitive dependence on initial conditions."
From (1) it follows "by definition" that (2) "history is chaotic."
Reisch then appeals to certain facts about chaotic systems, namely (3) Classical chaotic systems are causally deterministic (no appeal is made to "quantum chaos"), yet because perfect information about initial conditions is practically unattainable, it is almost always not possible to predict accurately the course of causally linked events beyond a very short temporal throw. Now historians cannot be better positioned than natural scientists to acquire information about a given (say, initial) state of a system of interest. Indeed, for historians, the problem here seems exponentially worse. The level of accuracy the laws demand simply is not available for events temporally far removed from us, and would be very hard to come by even now (a point on which McCloskey insists as well). "In the social sciences, not to mention traditional history, this accuracy is hard -and probably impossible -to come by" (17; see also 18). So, to (R), (1), (2) and (3) Reisch adds (4) It is, in practice, extremely difficult, if not in principle impossible, for historians to obtain the requisite detailed and extremely accurate information about initial conditions which laws in chaotic historical systems require in order to forecast outcomes accurately.16 15. Reisch (4): "By a 'system' I loosely refer to some discrete natural phenomenon whose behavior is governed by, and can be modeled with, certain laws or principles."
16. "It is not the intricacies of narrative sentences or descriptive categories that cripple covering law history. The coup de grace lies in the unattainable standards of descriptive accuracy we would have to achieve if we had all the tools we needed to begin the program" (17, fn. 17). Now it is merely a matter of turning the crank: Historians may still construct causal accounts, even in the absence of the complete knowledge of historical initial conditions required by the laws allegedly governing the system as a whole, by restricting their ambitions. That is, they must partition the time span over which putative laws act into "many small consecutive intervals or scenes" (18). Hence, while a full covering-law explanation is practically impossible, a limited, narratively framed causal type of explanation remains a live option.
For if puny and unknowable details do in fact play an essential role in some particular history, narrative accounts of that history need not have access to that detail. The 17. As Reisch remarks, "Assuming that historical laws are available, covering-law history therefore stands or falls with access to historical details that are generally inaccessible. And the only way that it can remain standing is to divide the time over which its laws purportedly act into many small consecutive intervals or scenes. That is, covering-law explanations must be resolved into narrative temporal structures" (18). narrator can still describe and emplot events and the effects of that detail even though the detail itself and its causal power is not recognized. As a causal explanation the resulting narrative would appear, from some ideal vantage, to be incomplete or incorrect. But at least it would remain parallel and in step with events that actually occurred. (18) This means, essentially, that "covering-law explanations must be resolved into narrative temporal structures" (18). This resolution does not deny explanatory power to covering laws. Indeed it retains a role for them in providing the "global" contours within which particularist narratives of causally-related events can be only-too-fallibly embedded (Reisch does not reject outright the suggestion [of, for example, "social force" or structuralist historians] that stable, long-term factors and trends influence historical processes. However, such historians typically "confuse constraint with determination" (8). Within the "envelopes" constituted by such constraints, "all kinds of things happen" (8). Constraints of this kind do not determine, to use an example of McCloskey's, the outcome of the Battle of Gettysburg. In a chaotic system, a seemingly minor happening in the proverbial heat of battle can determine the outcome. Thus, although the event may be determined, we cannot know in advance how things will turn out. The appearance of indeterminacy stems from the fact that, due to "puny and unknowable details," it is not really possible for us to integrate over all the proximate or contiguous temporal states treated in our "scene by scene descriptions" as the Hempelian account demands.
Reisch's case for this restricted conception of historical explanation thus appears to conclude: (7) By describing linkages between events over "necessarily small temporal steps" (17), causal accounts of events can be constructed. This point is posed as a paradox'8: if the best causal story is that the event seems the result of a system exhibiting chaotic behavior, then a causal story is untellable (34). Interminable detail defeats not just efforts to apply laws, but attempts as well to isolate causally significant factors within the welter of events. For chaotic systems, recall, the slightest inaccuracy in the description of a state variable may completely undermine forecasting the system's evolution for the very near future. To this initial paradox McCloskey adds another, a paradox of foreknowledge: "If the patterns of chaos were so simple then the actors in the history would see them, and would eliminate them by making use of their knowledge" (36). If patterns are discernible, they are alterable. Yet, where there is no demonstrated ability to recognize, predict, and alter causal patterns, this is most likely to be due to complexity of detail overwhelming attempts to tell the story. So, McCloskey concludes: (5') When a system is chaotic, there is no story (scientific or traditional) we can hope to tell"9 (unless, per impossible, we already know its structuring metaphor).
Contrary to Reisch, McCloskey concludes that whenever historical events are chaotic then they are not narratable as causal stories.20 If McCloskey and Reisch disagree in their assessment of the Causal Thesis, wherein lies for McCloskey a reason for maintaining that chaos theory has something to offer the historian?
The apparent answer is that by stressing that both historians and scientists can avail themselves of formal models as metaphors for structuring the domain of phenomena which concern them, one reveals the availability of a common mode of discourse across disparate disciplines.2' Extending this point, McCloskey then maintains that parallel complexities arise for the humanist as for the scientist when confronting chaotic systems. "Here I want to give another example, of how life gets difficult for the engineer and the historian when the differential equation does. The big difficulty shows up when the differential equations are 'nonlinear"' (25 25. "for the stock market, like most historical entities we care about, is not a closed or isolated system" (16).
26. Recall that the present discussion concerns only classical dynamical systems, not the alleged indeterminism of quantum mechanics. 27. A "generalized" state or phase space is a set of "points" which are ordered sets of real numbers (xI, X2, ..., x.> and is denoted R . In the more familiar Hamiltonian formulation, phase space is always R2n dimensional, each "point" being represented by n coordinates of position and n coordinates of momentum. For a "popular" account of the latter, see R. Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind (Oxford, 1989), 174-184. 28. Notorious examples involve signals (causal influences) allegedly propagating at superluminal velocities, such as are theoretically permitted in some non-special relativistic worlds. The foregoing Reisch's support for (1) is simply a litany of anecdotes followed by the assertion that historical systems show the extreme sensitivity to initial conditions characteristic of chaotic systems. But "sensitivity to initial conditions" has a precise meaning: the state variables of the system have been identified and are measurable, and a dynamical law governing the system's evolution has been defined. To be sure, Reisch assumes knowledge of such a law for the purposes of his argument, in which case it would be perverse for the knowledgeable historians to be blind to the difficulty of strong initial condition dependence of their laws. But Reisch must and does acknowledge that such laws and their variables are not known.29 Given this lack of knowledge then the phrase "sensitivity to initial conditions" has only a suggestive metaphorical sense which lacks the cognitive authority required to undergird the purported fact that "history is chaotic" (19; cf. 6, 7, 9, 13, 17, 18) .
It thus appears that Reisch can offer no serviceably precise sense to the claim that history is chaotic. Yet even if he could Reisch's conclusion against the applicability of the covering-law model to historical explanations still does not follow. Rather, it would follow only if we retain intact the Hempelian symmetry between explanation and prediction, a tenet much contested in the voluminous literature on scientific explanation.30 For the very systems Reisch invites us to consider suggest that the symmetry thesis can be modified and yet the essentials of the covering-law model retained. Indeed, some current trends in the study of chaotic systems lead precisely to this juncture. Literal prediction -in the sense of a direct solution for a nonlinear dynamical equation for an arbitrary time -is nigh impossible, given inevitable inaccuracies in the statement of initial conditions. However, a number of leading researchers in the field appear to believe that the behavior of such systems can be "imitated." Specifically, they are currently working to develop and perfect computer simulations of the temporal evolution of the relevant nonlinear dynamics in such complex systems as stocks and commodities markets,31 Reisch's paradigm example of an unpredictable account is, we believe, the only serviceable definition of classical determinism in the literature. For details and criticisms of Laplacian determinism in the context of classical physics, see J. Earman, A Primer on Determinism (Amsterdam, 1986), especially chapters III and IX. Incidentally, it is unwarranted to link unpredictability in classically deterministic systems (so defined) solely with inaccuracies (slight or otherwise) in fixing the initial data of the system. For unpredictability, even in the face of perfect initial information, can arise due to the thermodynamical tendency of the "flow" of the system to "spread out" in phase space, though its volume (theorem of Liouville) remains an invariant over time. As a rule, the problem worsens the higher the dimensionality of the representing phase space. If we, for the moment, indulge the conceit of viewing historical happenings in terms of (surely, very high dimensional) classical dynamical systems, we can readily see that unforeseen outcomes need have nothing to do with imperfect initial information. 35. A further difficulty is raised here by Dyke, who also takes seriously the suggestion that chaos theory adds insight to our understanding of historical events. He takes very seriously the precise issue which McCloskey slights, namely under what conditions may we plausibly assume that some historical event is a nonlinear dynamical system (see especially 379-389). Dyke's suggestion here is that the most plausible sort of system to consider in this regard is periodicities of the sort considered by the Annales historians -the tongue dure&. Thus, on Dyke's account, McCloskey's examples lack plausibility because they are not of sufficient historical time. It is interesting to note how Dyke's extremely cautious conclusion contrasts with his enthusiastic initial pronouncements (compare, e.g., 369 and 389-390).
are inherent in the apparently suggestive analogy between nonlinear systems and historical events. The promised benefits of chaos theory vis-a-vis history are at best an extremely loose heuristic which easily seduces the unwary into taking at face value terms and concepts that have a specifiably precise meaning only within the confines of mathematical theory. Outside of this context the use of these terms and concepts furthers tendencies to promote pseudoscientific "accounts" of the character of history, accounts which some of the more circumspect exponents of the "chaotic paradigm" in historical studies take some pains to eschew.
Beyond this threatening obfuscation, the primary intellectual issue joined by the promotion of the chaotic paradigm in historical studies seems to be spurred by desires to resist the tired hegemonies of "global" meta-narrative histories, whether by driving yet another nail in the coffin of the Hempelian covering-law model of historical explanation (an enterprise we thought was long ago passe), or by opposing the viability of structuralist or "social force" theories of historical determinism. While we sympathize with these latter aspirations, we remain decidedly skeptical that any truly beneficial assistance to metahistorical studies will be rendered by over-blown comparisons with the dynamics of nonlinear systems.
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